Carrier sanctions are penalties given to transport companies if they carry improperly documented passengers. While the literature on carrier sanctions grapples primarily with comparative legal and normative questions surrounding asylum-seeking and democratic accountability, the empirical material covering the implementation of carrier sanctions is more limited. None of the literature to date has examined the statistical trends in the enforcement of carrier sanctions by European states. This article fills this gap and provides the first comparative analysis of statistics on the yearly number and costs of carrier sanctions. Through a new dataset on the implementation of carrier sanctions in 10 European countries between 2000-2014, the data reveal a puzzling variation in carrier sanction implementation over time, with wide variation among states, due in part to the un-reliability of the data. These variations are discussed in the context of current legal, political, and migratory trends in Europe.
sanctions, and finds that they have become more restrictive over the years of coverage.12
In the literature on legal aspects of carrier sanctions, there is a general consensus among researchers that they are harmful to international legal and human rights obligations, a form of unjustifiable coercion, and overall contribute to increased risks to populations in search of protection.13 Carrier sanctions have had the effect of deterring asylum-seekers and restricting the rights of refugees.14 Feller argues that carrier sanction legislation is "fundamentally flawed" as it undermines basic principles of refugee protection.15 UNHCR, Amnesty International, and ECRE each provided their reservations towards the policy in the 1990s.16 Cruz's comparative work found a number of incompatibilities of carrier sanctions with legal and human rights obligations in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and the UK.17 Lax demonstrates, with regard to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), that "passive interception measures" like carrier sanctions "may, under certain conditions, breach the requirements of human rights law."18 The Carrier Sanctions Directive has been criticized because it does not provide appropriate safeguards against refoulement, nor access to remedies for those who have been refused boarding.19 According to Gammeltoft-Hansen, "carrier sanctions today constitute a primary tool for ensuring pre-arrival migration control and a major obstacle for many migrants and refugees to reach the territory of their prospective destination state by regular travel."20 Bloom and Risse argue that carrier sanctions represent a form of 'hidden coercion' at international borders which is unjustifiable.21 While these two strands of literature provide us with a solid ground on which to explain and scrutinize carrier sanctions in comparative contexts, none of these works have engaged in a comparison of carrier sanction data using available statistics of trends in fines, and trends in the amount of fines are often presented in isolation. Empirical studies explaining the development of carrier sanctions, their implementation, and their impacts suffer from limited data and small-n case studies. This article attempts to fill some of the gaps in the literature by analyzing a novel data set of trends from across Europe that is neither comprehensive nor unproblematic. The dataset is comprised of figures from 10 European countries on the number and amount of carrier sanctions levied. Given the difficulties in collecting the limited primary quantitative data available on the topic, the statistical trends are supplemented with qualitative interviews and socio-legal analysis of documents and secondary data. One of the major issues that arose from the work is the (un)reliability and variable quality of the data, which have impacted the discussion and results (see more below in the Methods section). The paper begins by outlining the methods used to gather the statistics on carrier sanctions and the main challenges faced during collection. It then describes the main statistics before turning to a discussion of the variation in trends. It concludes with theoretical and normative implications, providing suggestions for future research.
Methods
Lack of reliable and valid data plagues research on carrier sanctions, even while the practice has a significant impact on the rights of asylum-seekers and migrants. This section highlights the difficulties in collecting data on carrier sanctions in Europe. and airlines are having to adapt, with consistent statistics getting lost in the changes; statistics are not useful for training staff, and thus are not collected as they are not deemed necessary for operations; costs of fines are considered low compared to other potential sanctions, so airlines do not collect regular statistics as the budget line can be lumped together with other items (however, if there are too many fines, then it is necessary to re-think and check operations).29 Statistics are not always seen as important, for example KLM has articulated that addressing the reasons for the sanction are more important than the sanction itself.30 Finally, carriers which may be partly owned by the state have different relations with regulators than carriers which are wholly privately owned, raising the issue that statistics are not necessary for different kinds of organizations.
Both governments and carriers are 'reluctant' to release such numbers to avoid a negative public image or identify those passengers who have been rejected from traveling.31 Annual reports of major airlines do not cover such statistics, as revealing sanctions may impact investor relations. For example, International Airlines Group, which owns British Airways, Iberia, and Vueling, in their 2014 annual report, published for the first time the value of fines and sanctions for non-compliance with existing laws, while mentioning that 'historic data is unavailable' .32 While the types of fines are disaggregated in the report, none of them are very specific and none refer to carrier sanctions in particular.
A lack of clarity regarding the competent authority leads to variations in availability. The competence for handling the sanction is split amongst multiple authorities in some cases. For example, after an email requesting data, I received a phone call from the Greek police headquarters to inform me that they are only partially competent to answer my questions regarding carrier sanctions.33 I spoke with a managing officer who did not have practical experience, but said that he would forward my requests for an interview to Civil Aviation and to the Border Police at Athens International Airport. The guard informed me that the police report the undocumented migrants to Civil Aviation, and then Civil Aviation orders the fine to the airlines. After the police report the undocumented migrants to Civil Aviation, their role is finished. After some more emails and phone calls, I was able to contact the competent authority in the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority, who granted me the statistics by email (see Table of Sources).
Selection of Case Studies
The data I sought were the yearly number and amount of fines for select EU Member States from 2000 to 2014. Initially the case studies were limited to four Mediterranean countries-Spain, Italy, Malta, and Greece-in line with the cases included in the Human Costs of Border Control Project.34 However, difficulties in obtaining these statistics in these countries led me to search for statistics in other European states, both EU and non-EU. This led to a wider selection of case studies as it was easier in some countries (Sweden and Switzerland for example) to obtain statistics via personal communication than others. Some data were available publically online (such as in the UK and Germany). Availability of data raises questions of reliability, which I discuss below.
Data Collection
Collecting data on carrier sanctions requires personal communication with competent authorities and persistence in locating and extracting the appropriate data. A range of sources were used in this study: I approached the Commission and the Parliament (DG Home, DG Move, LIBE Committee, TRAN Committee); Member State Ministries and police agencies; Civil aviation authorities; state statistics agencies; non-governmental organizations; business federations and airline federations; and international organizations such as ICAO and IATA. The final sources used are available in Table 1 .
Most organizations I contacted did not collect the data or referred me those authorities that did. I contacted competent authorities through Internet searches in multiple languages (English, French, Spanish, German, Italian) in order to identify the appropriate authority. I then trawled governmental websites for potential documents and publications which contained the appropriate data. Identifying the appropriate authority could be a hassle, as I would be referred to different authorities only eventually to be referred back to the original person I contacted. Once identifying the appropriate authority, I emailed them and/or made phone calls. The data were not always complete, nor digitized (required the scanning of paper documents). The UK for example had comprehensive material online and searchable, while the material for Greece was only communicable via email. In a stroke of luck, I was emailed the statistics from Germany from a colleague, and corroborated through further emails with an NGO, which referred me to the final source. Data from the Netherlands could not be located even after a number of emails, but I was able to obtain some limited data from KLM from a public conference presentation. When possible I contacted relevant officials in the language of the country, using translations of colleagues when necessary (see Acknowledgements). Communication of the data was almost always accompanied by minor caveats and descriptions, and in some cases it was not clear what type of data I received, requiring multiple clarifications and corrections. For example, the data for Sweden may not be valid as it is unclear if the data are what was requested: there was a potential miscommunication issue with the provider, it was unclear if they understood the question asked in the email, and the issue was not resolved through further email. Furthermore, some sources were unclear if all transport types, or only airlines, are included in stats, and confirmations with the responsible sources were not responded to. I assume that the number of fines is primarily for air carriers, but this lack of assurance is a major limitation of the data. After collection, the data were compiled to look for any patterns or identifiable trends. The data are patchy and incomplete, but the overall trends reveal that carrier sanction legislation is variably enforced across European countries: some countries see an increase in fines (like Germany), others a decrease (like the UK and NL), others remain roughly the same but with minor increases or decreases (such as Spain and Italy), and others have given effectively no sanctions (like Sweden and Switzerland) (see Table 2 for more detail).
Issues with Data Collection and Analysis
According to previous work by Guiraudon, a number of difficulties arise when trying to assess carrier sanctions:35
[C]ompanies are reluctant to give out information, government bodies rarely and parsimoniously release data on sanctions and seldom evaluate the implementation of the policy, even when required by law…. It is even impossible to see the penalties appear either as a credit in the state budget or as a debit in the companies' financial statements. Given the problematic nature of the data, there are risks of trying to explain unreliable and incomplete data. I have wherever possible supplemented the analysis with secondary sources and available academic analyses, but drawing conclusions from such un-reliable data is challenging. Are the trends described reliable representations of carrier sanctions in Europe or do the trends reflect more the ways in which states produce such data and how we as researchers collect such data? Do the trends reflect variable numbers of people entering Europe or do they reflect better reporting standards on behalf of the responsible authorities? Some data may be more reliable than other data due to variable reporting standards among countries, but it is difficult to make any conclusions about the reliability of the data without more detailed information. Answering the question whether some data is more reliable cannot be adequately addressed unless engaging in speculation. We can speculate that the UK and Germany have more reliable data because of their public availability and comprehensiveness, but Maltese data are also comprehensive but not public. For the other countries in the study, data were requested from authorities but were hard to access, scattered, and patchy. In consequence we cannot formally model and test hypotheses about the causes and effects of carrier sanctions. Cases are not selected randomly, but were selected by convenience and non-random. Thus, based on these issues, this study aims for an interpretive, hypothesis-generating, explorative account of variations in carrier sanctions, focusing on national trends.
Description of Carrier Sanction Trends
Context Carrier sanctions statistics, however limited, cannot be judged in isolation. Contextual factors, such as volume of travelers and asylum-seekers, trends in routes, and alternative flanking measures help to place carrier sanctions within the European border control regime.
First, the volume of travelers to European territory is important for understanding the relative scale of sanctions. Passenger arrivals to EU territory have been increasing steadily between 2000 to 2015.36 In 2014 37% of air passenger traffic to the EU-28 was extra-EU.37 321 million passengers required border checks in 2013, with arrivals from third countries into Schengen just over 
Third, the numbers of individuals applying for asylum in the EU has increased. Between 2008 and 2014, asylum applications rose from around 225 thousand to around 627 thousand, doubling in 2015 to 1.3 million.47 With regard to the countries covered here, there were increases in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, with decreases in Greece and Malta between 2008 and 2014.48
National Trends
As Table 2 indicates, carriers face various levels of sanction for transporting improperly documented passengers. Unfortunately, the available statistics I collected are not disaggregated by nationality or origin of the carrier. Recall that the coverage of the statistics varies (see Table 1 vary in part because of this differential coverage. We would expect carrier sanctions to go down, given that governments and airlines are working together more closely, but the trends vary, and the unreliability of the data adds to the aggravation in interpreting the trends. In this section I will describe the national trends, and in the next section I will discuss the possible reasons for this variability.
The German statistics reveal perhaps the most striking increase, with the number of fines increasing from 9 in 2007 to over 1200 in 2014. This rise occurs in the context of administrative restructuring within the police and new In Malta the trend is decreasing, with low numbers compared to the UK. For the Netherlands, the data only comes from KLM, a severe limitation given the size and volume of passengers passing through Schiphol Airport. Due primarily to a Memorandum of Understanding between the Dutch government and KLM, the trend is clearly decreasing. In the UK the trend is decreasing the most dramatically across cases (although not as dramatic as the increase in fines in Germany), and represents the case with the highest numbers of all cases. The UK however provides numbers for all types transport across land, maritime, and air. For Sweden, there were 10 total cases only between 2005-2014 at Stockholm Arlanda Airport according to the source. The lack of data from other airports or at the national level hampers any reliable interpretation of the results. Finally, in Switzerland, all cases of carrier sanctions were thrown out, meaning there were effectively 0 cases.
Estimating Costs
The costs of a sanction can vary. Directive 2001/51 obliges Member States "to take the necessary measures to ensure that the penalties applicable to carriers … are dissuasive, effective and proportionate" (Art. 4) (The Council of the European Union, 2001). Financial penalties shall be at minimum between 3,000-5,000 EUR per passenger, or a lump sum of 500,000 EUR, however "other measures involving penalties of another kind, such as immobilisation, seizure and confiscation of the means of transport, or temporary suspension or withdrawal of the operating licence" are not prohibited (Art. 5). National laws may provide for different sanctions, giving some variability in the amount across countries.50 The reported costs of sanctions are provided in Table 3 . high, but these numbers are highly speculative, and should be treated with caution because the amount of fines can vary. The cost of individual sanctions is increasing according to the data, meaning that governments are attempting to gain compliance by increasing the severity of the cost of sanction. For example, while the number of sanctions are increasing in Germany, the cost per sanction is also increasing from 1000 EUR per sanction in 2007 to 2181 EUR in 2014. Alternatively, in the UK, with a decreasing trend in number of sanctions, the costs also increase from around 1319 GBP per sanction in 2000 to 2154 GBP in 2012. Penalties appear to be particular severe in the case of Greece and France, with low numbers but high costs (France increased costs for carrier sanctions in March 2016 under new reforms to the law on foreigners). According to an impact assessment of carrier sanctions in the UK, higher costs of sanctions "should act as an incentive to carriers to perform better document checks on their passengers" and "should lead carriers to rigorously enforce standards across all document processes and to also ensure they have an incentive to focus their effort on detecting document breaches".53
The costs for transporters of implementing carrier sanctions are hard to obtain. Money is spent on "advising, monitoring, training, negotiating, and sanctioning".54 Menz notes that "[a]nnual expenditure for major European airlines on this aspect of migration management is in the mid-double digit millions of euros".55 Exact costs for these implementation efforts is not possible to calculate given the lack of data. However, we can make some rough estimates which should be treated with care. According to Scholten, in a discussion of the costs associated with the MoU, she cites respondents claiming that costs of implementation are roughly equivalent to the fines not imposed.56 If we subtract the number of fines given to KLM in 2000 from those given in 2013 (587-147), we have 440 fines 'not imposed' , assuming the trend of fines would have remained stable without the MoU. Given that minimum costs for fines under Directive 2001/51 are between 3000-5000 EUR (note that these fines may be higher in national law depending on the category), then the estimated costs of implementation for KLM alone would at least be between 1. sanctions have been implemented.64 There has been (1) a shift from 'government regulation' to 'governance' , reflecting "general trends in changing governing structures," with a diversity of tasks shifted from the state to private enterprises; (2) historical involvement of carriers in immigration control impacts current trends; (3) political pressure to tighten borders and gain 'access' to mobile populations. I discuss other trends briefly below which may have an impact of the variability of carrier sanction trends. The cross-national variations are not easily explained due to the problematic nature of the data. In this discussion we must remain critical to these interpretations of why carrier sanctions are variable, but I do offer some hypothetical factors influencing the data which I have identified through interviews, primary sources, and secondary readings of the literature. However, the inferences we can draw from comparison are limited because cases were selected according to convenience, variation on the dependent variable (trends in fines) may not be reliable, and thus multiple causal factors can only be explored but not fully determined. Finally, discerning the effects of carrier sanctions is equally challenging, and I point to the secondary literature on its harmful effects in the introduction and conclusion. gives some discretion to states to apply different standards when implementing carrier sanctions legislation. In addition, court decisions have shifted the reasoning of authorities giving fines.70 For example the German Federal Administrative Court has overturned fines because of a lack of legal basis for the government authority to issue fines. 71 In the Netherlands, some cases have been dismissed and others settled out of court.72 Sanctions may in some cases be waived if the passenger is found to be a refugee. In the case of France, new legislation means that carriers originating in EU states cannot be fined.73 Thus, the variability of transposition, discretion given in the Directive, and court decisions, are bound to have some effect on the variability of fines given across countries.
Legal Basis at EU and National Levels

Administrative Structures of States
Changes in the administrative structure of the responsible government authorities or carriers can have effect on the number of sanctions given. For example, in Germany, the reform of the Federal Police in 2008 led to the creation of new headquarters, centralized competencies, and a new unit dealing specifically with carrier sanctions. 74 The result has been an increase in staff and the ability to better administer sanctions, increasing the number and amount of sanctions. In Malta authorities needed time to cope with the introduction of sanctions, resulting in a number a learning curve for authorities which took months to address. In other countries cooperation between carriers and governments created new structures of enforcement (see below). In other cases, a multitude of competent administrative structures may exist, or administrative structures may pass competence on to others without clear guidelines, meaning that sanctions are recorded across organizations and get lost, are lacking, or not well recorded, as in Spain, Greece, or Italy. Furthermore, streetlevel discretion is also likely to have an effect on the number of sanctions as in Switzerland or Sweden.
The size of firms operating carriers may also impact the number of sanctions, with larger and smaller companies suffering more or less sanctioning depending on the characteristic of the firm. 75 Since most of the national air carriers have gone through restructuring and/or privatization during a period of liberalization and unification of the airline market in Europe, these processes of firm-level restructuring have likely had an effect on the variability of sanctions as carriers shift tasks and responsibilities across the organization.76 New carriers entering the market, such as low-cost carriers, is also likely to have an effect on the number and amount of fines, as these carriers have more or less experience with dealing with undocumented passengers. For example, in Italy, the airlines most sanctioned are from Alitalia and Ryan Air.77 Training of carriers can change the ability of carriers to be in compliance with government regulations and has likely led to variations in the amount of fines. The International Air Transport Association (IATA), representing the airline industry, has carried out trainings.81 According to an account by Dunstan, UK authorities "provided training, advice and technical support in respect of the detection of false travel documents to airline staff based at various points of embarkation," including donations and trainings to the Ethiopian Immigration Service and Ethiopian Airline staff.82
Business-Government Relations
States' Externalization Practices
Carriers are often assisted by Immigration Liaison Officers, or other officials from the destination state stationed in the departure state, who assist carriers and border agents in conducting checks on documents through trainings and other operations. Other private security actors play a role in checking documents which may be removed from the carrier and the government. The plurality of regulatory authorities checking documents and acting as privatized agents of migration control signify that pre-entry clearances obliged by carrier sanctions serve as a de facto form of exit control, or the criminalization of emigration.83 Alpes' ethnographic material reinforces the hypothesis that preentry procedures, as obliged by carrier sanctions, block exit channels and push individuals towards irregular pathways. Variations in the discretion of migration control agents, whether public or private, lead to differing decisions during pre-entry clearance procedures, creating risks for vulnerable individuals. These pre-entry controls create real risks for individuals fleeing human rights abuses. Furthermore, her analysis suggests that the variability in numbers reflects discretionary practices of actors during pre-entry clearance, as people are prevented from flying from countries of departure where they may face abuse. New technologies of detecting fraudulent documents and stowaways is also likely to mediate the ability of governments to detected undocumented passengers, thus impacting the number of fines levied. Nevertheless, it is difficult to explain declining trends in carrier sanctions where privatization and externalization have increased. Carrier Practices Carrier practices which may impact the number and amount of sanctions relate to (1) heightened security measures and (2) discrimination towards certain social groups.
First, increased spending on security measures following 11 September 2001 attacks have impacted who participates in and how long check-in occurs. Guiraudon has shown how the blurring of public and private emerges in and through the hiring of former security forces by airlines: "the security agents hired by companies have either been trained by public agencies or are themselves former civil servants from the police forces, intelligence services or border police".84 Heightened security measures, and the involvement of multiple new actors (both private and public), have increased enplanement processing times, leading to long minimum check-in times and delays in boarding. 85 International passengers, who are usually boarding larger planes, thus require much more processing time than domestic passengers. Capacity shortages and other irregularities in airport operations will thus impact who and when sanctions are levied.86 These measures have had a likely impact on carrier sanctions by distributing 'expert' knowledge across employees and increasing the number of necessary checks on passengers, leading to higher costs and the need to reduce sanctions. 87 Second, discrimination is likely to play a role in the case of carrier sanctions, as well as profiling of suspected irregular migrants, by both carriers and governments. For example, when a group of Czech Roma asylum-seekers were refused to enter the UK at Prague Airport, no air carrier would carry them for risk of being fined. 88 In another development, TAP Portugal suspended operations between Guinea-Bissau and Portugal, with a stop-over in Senegal, in December 2013, after 74 asylum-seekers from Syria with allegedly fake Turkish passports were allowed to board and subsequently claimed asylum in Portugal.89 TAP European Journal of Migration and Law 19 (2017) claims that the airline was forced to board the asylum-seekers by the Guinean authorities, while the Guinean authorities claim that the passports appeared genuine and the passengers cleared border controls. 90 We can infer that TAP cancelled the route in fear of receiving sanctions for transporting more asylumseekers from this route.91 It is interesting to note that TAP has been accused in the past of discriminating on the basis of race and nationality.92 Finally, with regard to profiling, Emirates advocates that 'document check teams' cooperating internationally with border control authorities, coupled with sophisticated anti-counterfeit technologies, can be the solution to improperly documented travelers. 93 As part of this strategy, "there tends to be an emphasis on profiling due to the volume of passengers and time constraints." According to Emirates, carrier sanctions "are designed to have a two-fold effect-acknowledging the responsibility of airlines and driving the borders to the point of acceptance at the last point of departure."94
Political Pressures
Public opinion about migration is likely to shape the severity and amount of fines. In countries such as Sweden, which is publically more open to receiving migrants (78% of Swedish respondents have positive feelings towards immigration from countries outside the European Union), the number of sanctions was low. 95 In the UK, where the government is keen to reduce the number of undocumented travelers, and 49% of the public view immigration positively, numbers are high.96 In Germany, the numbers are increasing due to increased efficiency in administering sanctions as well as a highly charged political debate, yet 62% of the public view immigration positively.97 Calculating the co-variation of public opinion with fines is not possible given the paucity of reliable data.
Political pressure from domestic interests is also likely to affect the number of fines. Competent authorities face public pressure to reduce the number of undocumented travelers, leading to variation in fines. According to an unofficial position of the Minister of Justice of Sweden in 2015, following pressure from the Swedish Aviation Industry Group to lift sanctions so that airlines can transport asylum-seekers, it is "juridically impossible" for Sweden to lift sanctions, as the basis is an EU Directive.98 However, according to the Swedish statistics, almost no fines were provided (10 total at Arlanda across a 10 year period). This suggests that political pressure in some cases can reduce, and in other cases increase fines. Business groups may not want restrictive carrier sanction policies, but public officials are apt to express support for them to show they are in control of undocumented travelers. These findings support the hypothesis that "political salience" impacts implementation-variations in political pressures and public opinion will impact the number and amount of fines.99 They suggest that the 'salience' or visibility of the issue of carrier sanctions varies across Europe, and by implication the 'risk perception' of undocumented migration is variable.100 Differences in the 'salience' of carrier sanctions partly explains their variation across Europe-where the issue is of high salience, statistics are well recorded and carriers are fined heavily, where the issue is of low salience, statistics may be lacking, and/or fines less severe.
Conclusion
Based on a novel data set this study details trends in carrier sanctions in 10 European states over the time period of 2000-2014. To deal with the unreliability of the data collected, in-depth interviews with key actors and readings of primary and secondary literature were used as additional sources. It is necessary to understand trends in carrier sanctions because of the implications 97 Ibid. 98 Radio Sweden, 'Swedish airline industry wants to be able to fly refugees to Sweden such trends have for the privatization of migration management and effects on human rights. In relation to the number of sanctions levied and their growth or decline, the data indicate that carrier sanctions are variably implemented throughout Europe with differing trends across countries, and it is difficult to tease out the causes and effects of these trends. These findings raise a number of implications relevant for future work. First, trends in number and amount of sanctions are uneven, and by extension the implementation of legislation is somewhat haphazard and in some cases lacking. The variation is an expression of diverse local policy outcomes (which may be unintended), giving the impression that the implementation of carrier sanctions is incoherent and haphazard.101 Such 'incoherence' lends support to the hypothesis that carrier sanctions are in some cases a mostly symbolic control policy (as in Sweden or Switzerland, and in earlier years in Germany), whereas in other cases carrier sanctions are vigorously enforced and have real material value for states, not only symbolic (such as the UK and the Netherlands, and Germany in the later years).102 In other words, in some cases we see a large implementation gap between the goals of carrier sanctions and their implementation in practice, in others we see a small or non-existent gap.103 These findings raise the question whether states (and carriers) are in control of undocumented migration, and the answer is 'it depends': in some cases the state still plays a strong role in outsourcing migration control through regular and severe enforcement, while in others the state takes a more lenient approach to exacting penalties.
Second, the availability and transparency of carrier sanctions data are severely lacking. Existing sources are hard to obtain, may not be complete, and are not reliable, making it hard to draw a fully comparable and accurate picture of the evolution of carrier sanctions. The lack of statistics is evidence of larger deficiencies in carrier sanctions. 104 • Based on the current study, the available data is not reliable or comprehensive, and thus of poor quality. Improving the quality of carrier sanctions data is needed to assess their relevance for research, policy, and advocacy purposes.
• Collection of carrier sanction data at the national level should be improved.
• Carrier sanctions data should be regularly recorded, updated, and shared publically at the EU level.
• Evaluations should be carried out based on the new data in order to assess the implementation and effects of carrier sanctions. Carrier sanctions legislation is described by many studies as having detrimental effects on fundamental rights and international protection, supporting a near consensus in the literature that carrier sanctions are harmful to asylumseekers and those in need of international protection (see Introduction). The re-shaped relations between states, firms, and individuals represent a decline in the moral, ethical, and legal obligations of states and firms towards populations in need of protection, blurring the lines of who is responsible when abuses occur. Recent work by Gammeltoft-Hansen shows that refugees have a difficult time accessing complaint procedures when harms occur. 106 Abeyratne argued that while airlines do have responsibilities, states have greater obligations under refugee and international law. 107 Rodenhauser similarly argues that the activities of carrier personnel can be attributable to the state.108 There is also very little transparency and availability of data and practices, making it difficult to determine who is responsible when things go wrong, muddying the ability to determine accountability for abuses. Since "prospects for repealing
